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Executive summary
This case study explores the potential impact of climate change on security and conflict in
Bangladesh. As international researchers have started to make the link between climate
change, insecurity and conflict, they have raised concerns that Bangladesh’s extreme 
vulnerability to the environmental effects of climate change may create conditions that put 
it at risk of greater insecurity and possible conflict. It is therefore important to analyse this
issue in detail, in order to identify how serious the risk is and what can be done to address it.
A study of human security in Bangladesh by Saferworld undertaken in 2007 identified
numerous issues relating to both ‘freedom from want’ aspects of human security (e.g.
economic security, food security, health security and environmental security) and ‘freedom
from fear’ aspects (e.g. personal security, political security and tenure security). This report
considers how these factors may be affected by climate change. The authors hope that it will
contribute to the development of appropriate policies to address climate change-related
insecurity. It is based on field work in two groups of locations: places that are particularly
vulnerable to climate change (‘source areas’); and places that are destination areas for
migrants who are leaving these source areas. This field work has been combined with an
extensive desk review of available information on climate change and security issues in
Bangladesh.
The relationship between climate change and security is not necessarily direct, but depends
on a chain of consequences. For example, climate change causes environmental degradation.
In areas where this phenomenon occurs, it undermines livelihoods, reducing basic human
security and creating increased tension as competition for dwindling resources becomes
more intense. This tension can lead to crime and violence, increasing social instability. The
deteriorating economic and social situation also drives people to migrate from these areas to
towns and cities in search of a better life. However, this migration away from affected areas
can have negative effects on the economic and social situation in destination areas, which
i
may again lead to increased tension, crime and violence and the risk of serious social 
disturbances – leading in the worst-case scenario to violent conflict.
The field research found that in the source areas, there was a strong belief that climate
change was already occurring, manifested in rising temperatures, increased river and coastal
flooding and erosion, rising sea levels, increasing salinity, and more frequent, more intense
severe weather events. These naturally occurring hazards appear to be having a number of
negative effects on the economic livelihoods, health and food security of the local population:
■ Loss of property and material goods. An increasing number of people are suffering damage
or loss to their property. Houses have been swept away or destroyed by floods or erosion.
Villagers have lost their cattle in river flooding. Seeds have been swept away by floods.
Flooding and rising sea levels have also damaged roads and other essential infrastructure,
further limiting economic opportunities.
■ Loss and degradation of agricultural land. Land is being lost due to rising sea levels and 
erosion, and climate change models predict that in the next decades huge amounts of
further land could be lost in this way. Other land is becoming unproductive due to 
temperature rises and increased salinity. This is causing agricultural output to fall, as a result
of which food insecurity is growing.
■ Increased unemployment. The loss and degradation of land is leaving many people without
means of supporting themselves economically, and unemployment is rising. Unemployment
is also fuelled by the growth of shrimp farming, since shrimp farms employ many fewer 
people than the agriculture they have replaced.
■ Reduction in the availability of water. Some water sources have been contaminated due to
increased salinisation. The need to find water places a particular strain on women, since they
are usually responsible for providing the family with water and food.
■ Increase in the prevalence of diseases. The decline in the availability of fresh water is leading
to increased disease as people drink contaminated water. Flood water is also attracting 
mosquitoes that carry malaria and dengue fever. More frequent flooding also makes it 
harder to get access to health care.
■ Reduced availability of firewood. Floods wash away firewood, a crucial resource for cooking.
In turn, these problems are driving increased tension, crime and violence as livelihoods
break down and competition for resources intensifies:
■ Tension over land. There is increased competition for access to, and control of, land to use
for farming. In particular, incidences were reported of clashes between agricultural farmers
and shrimp farm workers fuelled by resentment over the impact that shrimp farming had
had on agricultural livelihoods.
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■ Tension over property. Increases in property theft are often reported following naturally
occurring hazards such as floods – cattle, household goods and farming equipment are
stolen.
■ Tension over water resources. Where water in one area has been contaminated, inhabitants
are forced to rely on other water sources, which can lead to tension and even violence as 
different groups compete for access to water.
■ Increased female insecurity and sexual violence. Women suffer particularly from losses
caused by naturally occurring hazards since it is harder for them to gain access to credit and
to secure their livelihoods. It is also perceived that the growth of shrimp farming is leading 
to an influx of workers from outside the area, and that this may be related to an upsurge in
sexual violence. Whether this is true or not, such suspicions can lead to a sharp increase in
tension between settled communities and the incoming shrimp farmers.
Bangladeshis are used to dealing with naturally occurring hazards and have developed
numerous coping strategies. However, their increasing frequency and intensity is now
threatening to overwhelm these coping mechanisms, causing more people to migrate away
from their homes, either temporarily or permanently.
Field research in destination areas provided evidence that an influx of migrants was leading
to greater competition for resources. There were three main triggers of conflict:
■ Disputes over land. High levels of physical insecurity and conflict were reported in 
destination areas as a result of competition for land. There is particularly fierce competition
for government-owned khas land, which has led to violence in some cases. In one area, local
gangs were restricting access to land and demanding money for rent. There have also been
clashes in response to attempts by vested interests and landowners to grab land and/or
forcibly evict migrants.
■ Competition for employment. Migrants add to the labour pool, increasing competition for
jobs. Migrants face a double insecurity: not only is it hard for them to find employment, but
they also face reprisals from existing residents who blame them for unemployment and
falling wages. This has led to migrants being harassed and attacked by local people.
■ Competition for access to water. As in source areas, there is increasing competition for water.
This leads to clashes between groups and forces many people to travel long distances to find
water.
Most migrants end up in urban slums, particularly in Dhaka, and there is some evidence that
this constant influx of people is contributing to rising crime and insecurity in these areas.
No primary field research was carried out on the possible links between climate change and
regional migration. Nonetheless, the paper notes concerns that climate change will force
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ever greater numbers of Bangladeshis to migrate out of the country, mostly illegally. The
most common destination will be India, and such migration could become a very sensitive
issue in diplomatic relations between the two countries and has the potential to contribute
to regional instability.
Recommendations
There is significant evidence to suggest that environmental degradation is already fuelling
insecurity, and in particular, is related to a growth in internal migration. Climate change is
predicted to have an overall negative impact on long-term security and conflict factors,
acting as a threat multiplier that increases the volatility of existing causes of conflict and 
may generate new insecurities. The following steps are recommended (more detailed 
recommendations are provided in the full report):
■ Promote a cross-governmental approach to climate change and security. Climate change
policy and security policy share strong mutual interests and should be co-ordinated 
effectively. This might involve the establishment of climate security working groups bring-
ing together different government departments and tiers with international institutions,
climate scientists, conflict prevention/peacebuilding experts and local civil society 
organisations. Donor programming on migration, land, environment, climate change and
security also needs to be joined up more effectively. Policies and funding streams relating
both to climate change and to conflict and security must fully acknowledge the linkages
between climate change and insecurity and approach the resourcing of relevant programmes
in a flexible manner.
■ Ensure that all climate change adaptation and development programming is conflict-
sensitive. A peace and conflict impact assessment of existing and future climate change 
programmes should be carried out in order to identify strategies which will reduce 
insecurity and the risk of conflict most effectively. Conflict-sensitive approaches and related
research should be built into the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan.
■ Integrate analysis of the predicted impact of climate change into all future conflict analyses.
All future peace and conflict impact assessments relating to programming in Bangladesh
should include the potential impact of climate change as a factor impacting on conflict
dynamics – not only when looking at climate change policy, but for all programmes.
■ Strengthen the capacity of local government. Many environmental security issues are local
in nature and local government must play a leading role in addressing (or adapting) to these
challenges in a conflict-sensitive manner.
■ Begin a debate on the balance between mitigation and adaptation policies. There is a fun-
damental question underlying climate change policy which must be addressed immediately.
Internationally, the overwhelming emphasis until recently has been on taking steps designed
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to prevent or reduce climate change, while relatively little attention has been paid to 
adaptation mechanisms. However, if it is not possible completely to mitigate climate change,
more attention and resources will need to be spent on adaptation – including adapting to the
insecurity caused by climate change. National and international debate is urgently required
on how to strike a balance (in terms of funding and priority of implementation) between
policies that seek to prevent climate change, those that seek to adapt to its immediate 
environmental consequences, and those that seek to adapt to the impact of environmental
degradation on social and political stability.
■ Allow local communities to spend adaptation resources on conflict prevention and security-
building if required. Local communities should be able to spend resources allocated to 
‘adaptation’ on community security measures if they believe it to be necessary (for example
if competition for resources is leading to conflicts that could be resolved through dispute
resolution mechanisms).
■ Strengthen capacity to manage internal migration. Given the predicted scale of migration
and the impact that this could have on conflict and security issues, it is clear that major
efforts are required to strengthen the state’s capacity to manage internal migration.
■ Conduct more detailed policy research. This paper has identified some worrying trends,
but more research is required in order to understand them in more detail and develop
appropriate responses. Some priorities for research include:
■ mapping of the areas most likely to experience insecurity as a result of environmental
change, in order to assess the scale of the risk and plan appropriate responses
■ analysis of existing community security and conflict prevention mechanisms in these 
vulnerable areas
■ thorough analysis of the extent to which climate change impacts are fuelling migration
from affected areas, in order to predict how severely climate change will fuel such 
migration in future
■ precise mapping of the likely movement of migrants within Bangladesh and to 
neighbouring countries, and
■ review of current formal and informal strategies for managing internal and cross-border
migration and their capacity to cope with climate change-related migration.
■ Adopt a regional approach to combating climate change and managing migration. Further
research is required into how climate change will affect regional security and conflict
dynamics, and how prepared national, bilateral, regional and global security mechanisms
are to cope with any threats that occur – particularly greater cross-border migration.
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Introduction
In 2007, Saferworld undertook a major piece of research on human security in Bangladesh.1
This study took a broad understanding of human security as comprising both ‘freedom
from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. It found that among the many insecurities faced by
Bangladeshis, environmental insecurities were among the most prominent. Natural disasters
were the most frequently cited cause of insecurity in a household survey undertaken for the
study, with over half of all respondents (53 percent) listing natural disasters as a major 
concern. Other environmental problems such as riverbank erosion and the loss of natural
resources were also recorded as significant challenges. It also noted that climate change could
exacerbate these problems and cause even greater insecurity.
A key theme running through the study was that ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from
fear’ insecurities are often closely intertwined. It suggested that this is also true of climate
change,“Climate change is not in itself the insecurity, so much as the change it engenders…
While the environmental consequences of climate change are well-known, the social changes
it will cause, and responses to them, have not been sufficiently discussed.”2 This report seeks
to stimulate such discussion.
Why climate change is a security issue
There is now a strong international scientific and political consensus that the world is 
experiencing climate change, and that this could lead to huge environmental changes in
many parts of the world. Yet while policy-makers and scientists have focused on how to 
prevent or slow down climate change, it is now acknowledged that even in a best-case 
scenario it will be impossible to avoid some consequences. This was made explicit in the
Fourth Assessment Report of the Working Group III on the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), ‘Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability’, published in 2007.
It concluded that,“Past emissions are estimated to involve some unavoidable warming
1
Climate change refers to any
change in climate over time as a
result of both natural variability
and human activity. 
Human security is considered
to have two main components:
‘freedom from fear’, which
focuses primarily on violence,
crime and justice, and ‘freedom
from want’, which is more 
concerned with deprivation and
capability, for example, health,
economic and food security.
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(about a further 0.6°C by the end of the century relative to 1980–1999) even if atmospheric
greenhouse gas concentrations remain at 2000 levels” and that therefore “there are some
impacts for which adaptation is the only available and appropriate response”.3 If it is not 
possible to halt climate change, people will need to adapt to the consequences.
What might these consequences be? The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report looked mostly at
environmental consequences, though it also considered the impact on human health and on
‘industry, settlement and society’. Some policy-makers and researchers have developed this
analysis further by considering how the environmental changes caused by climate change
might in turn affect peace and security. A number of reports have been published in the last
couple of years that suggest that climate change may have negative impacts on conflict and
security dynamics in many parts of the world. For example, a report by the German 
Advisory Council on Global Change argued that,“without resolute counteraction, climate
change will overstretch many societies’ adaptive capacities within the coming decades. This
could result in destabilisation and violence, jeopardising national and international security
to a new degree”.4 Similarly, International Alert concluded that ‘there is a real risk that 
climate change will compound the propensity for violent conflict which, in turn, will leave 
communities poorer, less resilient and less able to cope with the consequences of climate
change’.5
It is difficult to predict exactly how climate change will affect conflict and security dynamics.
First, some uncertainty remains about exactly what environmental changes will take place.
Secondly, there are many factors that may make violent conflict more or less likely to occur
and the interplay between such factors in any given situation will be impossible to predict
with total certainty. Nonetheless, researchers have suggested that various forms of insecurity
may become more prevalent in areas affected by climate change, leading to more crime and 
a greater risk of violent conflict. These include:
■ increased insecurity in communities most affected by climate change as a result of increased
competition for dwindling resources, manifested in increased tension and mistrust and a
rise in crime
■ insecurity in ‘destination areas’ i.e. areas which receive migrants from areas affected by 
climate change, as a result of tensions and competition for resources between existing 
residents and incoming migrants
■ a weakening of the capacity of the state to provide security, because the economy has been
seriously disrupted (e.g. because of natural disasters or the loss of important natural
resources) and there are fewer resources available, and/or because of an increase in the scale
and forms of insecurity that the state must address
■ tension between states over increased cross-border migration, with the risk of violent 
interstate conflict if this is poorly managed, and
■ tension between states due to increased competition for resources.6
Conflict The term ‘conflict’ is
used in this paper to refer 
particularly to violent conflict.
Violent conflict is a conflict
between parties which involves
the use of physical force for the
purpose of violating, abusing
and damaging the other party.
However, while there may be a serious risk of increased insecurity, crime and violent
conflict, it is not inevitable. For those living and working in countries at risk of climate
change, it is thus crucial to understand the impact climate change could have on security
dynamics while there is still time to formulate appropriate adaptation strategies.
Purpose of the report
This case study considers the potential impact of climate change on security and conflict
dynamics in Bangladesh. The country is predicted to experience serious environmental
changes as a result of climate change. Some environmental changes are already occurring
which many attribute to climate change (see Chapter 2), and Bangladesh’s low-lying land
and geographical position make it particularly vulnerable. Given Bangladesh’s relative
poverty and under-development, the state may find its capacity to adapt to such challenges 
is limited and this may generate insecurity. Following such logic, Bangladesh has been 
identified as one of 46 countries that may face “a high risk of armed conflict as a consequence
of climate change”.7
Yet while climate change may heighten insecurity and increase the risk of violent conflict in
Bangladesh, very little analysis is available as to how this could happen, how serious the risk
is, or what might be done to mitigate this risk. This case study seeks to begin to address this
gap. It tests these international theories about how climate change might affect security and
conflict dynamics against what is currently happening in Bangladesh and what might 
happen in future. It is not intended as a comprehensive study, but rather provides an insight
into the potential impact that climate change might have on security to generate further
debate and study of this important topic.
From a theoretical perspective, this report will provide a case study for researchers who are
exploring the relationship between climate change and insecurity at the international level.
On a more practical level, this analysis could help national and international policy-makers
to understand better how climate change might impact upon security and conflict dynamics
in Bangladesh and in South Asia more generally. This in turn may make it possible to design
policies and adaptation strategies that are better able to address any potential security threats
related to climate change.
Methodology
This report is based on a combination of desk-based research and primary field research 
carried out by Saferworld and the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic 
Studies (BIISS). The field work was conducted in Bangladesh in 2008. The desk research
reviewed international analyses of the links between climate change, insecurity and violent
conflict and national publications and official documents relating to climate change.
Academic research, articles and press reports were also analysed.
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Based on a prior acknowledgement that one of the most important consequences of climate
change is likely to be a major increase in migration (see Chapter 3), Saferworld and BIISS
selected two types of locations for the field research: areas affected directly by naturally
occurring hazards which cause people to move away (‘source areas’), and areas to which
migrants commonly travelled (‘destination areas’). The field research involved key inform-
ant interviews with a broad cross-section of stakeholders across Bangladesh, and focus
group discussions held in 20 locations. Eleven of the focus group discussions were in source
areas of environmental migration affected by salinity, river flooding/erosion and sea-level
rise.8 The remaining nine focus groups were in destination areas for migration. The
researchers also interviewed journalists, politicians, government officials, police representa-
tives and academics in all of the chosen locations. Further details on the methodology of the
field research and academic sources are in Annexes 1 and 2.
A summary of the locations selected and the reason for their selection as the geographical
focus of this study are shown opposite and a map of the research locations can be found
overleaf.
The interviews and focus groups
were held in two types of 
locations:
■ Source areas which are 
significantly affected by 
naturally occurring hazards
such as coastal and river
flooding, sea-level rise, river
erosion and increased 
salininisation
■ Destination areas which
are the most popular areas for
people to migrate to
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Sirajganj District 
Sirajganj is one of the areas most affected by
intense river flooding in Bangladesh. This is
because river erosion has altered the course of
the River Brahmaputra, bringing it closer to 
vulnerable villages. 
Bogra District
Bogra is situated inland away from many
sources of environmental insecurity. A number
of reasons compel migrants to relocate to Bogra
from Sirajganj including: familiarity with the
area and its climatic conditions, personal 
connections, the cost of renting land, close
proximity and lower costs for migrating. 
Dhaka
People migrate to Dhaka for the same reasons
identified above. 
Areas affected by river flooding and 
erosion
Common destination area for people
affected by river flooding and erosion
Kutubdia Island
Kutubdia is an island located off Chittagong in
the Bay of Bengal. Kutubdia has experienced
the highest rising sea levels in Bangladesh. 
Kutubdia also regularly experiences coastal
flooding. 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)
CHT has historically been a destination for
migrants from the Chittagong District. In 1991
for example, 30,000 people from Kutubdia
moved permanently to the CHT following a
cyclone. 
Cox’s Bazar
As one of the largest urban areas in the south-
east, Cox’s Bazar is a desirable location for
employment opportunities in the region. 
Areas affected by sea level rise Common destination area for people
affected by sea level rise
Khulna District
Khulna has experienced extensive river flooding
as a result of coastal flooding, which has led to
a rise in the salinisation of land over recent
years. Areas most affected by salinisation are
believed to be Gabura, Burigoaliny, Koikhali 
and Munshiganj Unions. 
Satkhira District
Satkhira District has likewise experienced 
extensive river flooding as a result of high
coastal sea levels, which has similarly led to a
rise in local salinisation.
Khulna District
Unaffected areas around an environmentally
vulnerable location are also common places for
migration. This is the case in the Khulna District
where people have moved within the district as
well as further afield. 
Dhaka
Dhaka is the capital city of Bangladesh and its
most significant urban centre. It is therefore a
desirable destination for those seeking employ-
ment. In addition, the geographical position of
Dhaka, away from areas of environmental 
vulnerability, acts as a further motivating factor. 
Areas affected by river flooding and 
salinisation 
Common destination area for people
affected by river flooding and salinisation 
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RAJSHAHI
DHAKA
SYLHET
KHULNA
BARISAL
BAY OF BENGAL
Dhaka
Satkhira
INDIA
MYANMAR
Cox’s 
Bazar
Bogra
Chittagong
Kutubdia
Island
Sirajgang
SATKHIRA
DISTRICT
SIRAJGANG
DISTRICT
1
2
3
4
5
Khulna
KHULNA
DISTRICT
CHITTAGONG
y
ttagong Hill Tracts
as affected by salinity intrusion as a 
lt of river and coastal flooding
hyamnagar Union
Munshiganj Union
abura Union
oyra Union
akshin Bedkashi Union
as affected by river flooding and erosion
as affected by sea level rise
1 Areas that have been highlighted
as being affected by sea level rise,
river flooding, erosion and salinity
intrusion are the areas focused 
on during the field research and 
do not reflect all areas affected by
these issues in Bangladesh.
Research locations
Key
Chitt gong Hill Tracts
Areas affected by alinity intrusion as a 
esult of river and coastal flooding
1 Shyamnagar Union
2 Munshiganj Union
3 Gabura Union
4 Koyra Union
5 D kshin Bedkashi Union
Areas affected by river flood ng and erosion
Areas affected by sea level rise
2
The environmental impact of
climate change 
In order to analyse the potential impact that climate change might have on conflict and 
security dynamics in Bangladesh, it is first necessary to clarify how climate change will affect
the natural environment in the country. This chapter provides a brief review of the main
environmental changes that are already being attributed to climate change, all of which are
expected to intensify in the next decades.
2.1 The increasing threat from naturally occurring hazards 
Even without climate change, Bangladesh has always been extremely vulnerable to naturally
occurring hazards. It has a low-lying topography and half of its total landmass is less than
two metres above sea level. Bangladesh’s geographical position in the tropics, on the Gulf of
Bengal and in the delta of three great rivers – the Ganges, Bramaputra-Jamuna and Meghna
– makes the country particularly vulnerable to coastal flooding and river flooding in inland
central and mid-western zones. Bangladesh is also regularly hit by cyclones and severe
storms, such as Cyclone Sidr in November 2007, which killed hundreds of people and
destroyed the livelihoods of thousands more. Droughts are also a threat to large parts of the
population.
Although it is difficult to differentiate natural climate trends from climate change, a number
of studies have shown that it appears that climate change at the very least is affecting the 
frequency and intensity of naturally occurring hazards. Evidence from the field research
supported this. Five key changes are already believed to be occurring, and each process is
expected to continue:
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■ rising temperatures
■ river and coastal flooding and erosion
■ rising sea levels
■ increasing levels of salinity
■ more frequent, more intense severe weather events.
Rising temperatures
The IPCC Working Group II report (2007) noted that Bangladesh has been experiencing 
rising temperatures as a result of climate change.9 The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report for 2007/8 stated that during 2005,
Bangladesh faced temperatures that were 5–6°C above the regional average.10
River and coastal flooding and erosion
The IPCC Working Group II report (2007) noted that Bangladesh experienced a rise in the
seriousness and frequency of floods during 2002, 2003 and 2004 as a result of climate
change.11 A report by the German Advisory Council on Global Change also stated that as a
result of the rise in sea level, coastal floods have greatly increased in recent decades in both
frequency and destructiveness.12 The Government of Bangladesh has estimated that 
approximately 10,000 hectares of land are lost annually to riverbank erosion.13 According to
a study by C R Abrar and S N Azad which interviewed over 200 households affected by 
riverbank erosion,“about one million people are directly affected by riverbank erosion each
year and landlessness in these areas could be as high as 70 percent”.14
Rising sea levels 
The IPCC Working Group II report (2007) identifies Bangladesh as one of the countries
most affected by climate change-induced sea-level rise.15 The sea level around Bangladesh
has risen considerably – by about 12cm since 2000.16 Research undertaken by Integrated
Regional Information Networks (IRIN) found that rising sea levels in the Bay of Bengal are
encroaching on vast areas of flat agricultural land in the southern districts of Khulna,
Satkhira, Bagerhat, Jessore and Magura – increasing levels of soil salinity and other 
environmental hazards. This has had a detrimental impact on the agricultural production
and livelihood sustainability of those living in the area. Golam Mohammad Sanaullah, a soil
scientist and former director of research at the Bangladesh Rice Research Institute (BRRI),
estimated that out of 37 million people living in 12 coastal districts, 20 million had been
affected by the rising sea.17
The risk to communities from the exacerbating effects of climate change is further illustrated
by field research conducted by the Climate Change Cell of the Department of Environment:
“A sea-level rise of 0.5 metres over the last 100 years has already eroded 65 percent landmass
of 250 square kilometres of Kutubdia, 227 square kilometres of Bhola and 180 square 
kilometres of Sandwip islands”.18
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“From the knowledge I have
gained through observing the
environment in this village
throughout my lifetime, I can
say that natural hazards –
particularly river flooding and
erosion – have become more
and more powerful over the
years, and I would predict that
this pattern will continue in the
future.”
Participant, focus group discussion,
Gala Union (Sirajganj District)
“We have noticed that the sea
level has been rising and the
shore line has been moving
inland gradually overtime. We
have also noticed an increase in
wave erosion and the intensity
of tidal waves is getting
stronger.”
Participant, focus groups discussion,
Kalikapur village (Kutubdia Island)
There have been a number of projections made regarding sea-level rises in Bangladesh, each
of which paints a bleak picture. The IPCC’s Third Assessment Report published in 2001
projected a sea-level rise of 30–100cm by 2100.19 The United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) estimates that sea level rise in Bangladesh will affect 17 million people
(15 percent of the population) and 22,000 square kilometres of land (16 percent of the total
landmass).20
Increasing levels of salinity
A soil survey undertaken by six government agencies, including the BRRI and the
Bangladesh Agricultural Research Council, found that since 1948, salinity in the rivers of
southern Patuakhali, Pirojpur, Boguna, Satkhira, Bagerhat and Khulna districts has risen by
45 percent.21 The survey also found higher-than-acceptable soil salinity in 72 percent of all
arable land in Magura district, about 200km from the sea.22
It is estimated that the total amount of land which has been affected by mild salinity in
Bangladesh has increased from 1.5 million hectares in 1973 to 2.5 million hectares in 1997.
This is likely to continue to increase.23
More frequent, more intense severe weather events
Climate change is also projected to increase monsoon rainfall levels and sea surface 
temperatures in Bangladesh, reducing the predictability and exacerbating the frequency and
intensity of cyclones, and also of droughts.25 The 2008 Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy
and Action Plan notes that “a severe tropical cyclone hits Bangladesh, on average, every three
years”.26 The most devastating were the tropical cyclones in 1970 and 1991, which are 
estimated to have killed 500,000 and 140,000 people respectively; Cyclone Sidr in 2007 led to
approximately 3,500 fatalities. The Action Plan predicts that “climate change will exacerbate
many of the current problems and natural hazards the country faces. It is expected to result
in … [inter alia] … increasingly frequent and severe tropical cyclones, with higher wind
speeds and storm surges leading to more damage in the coastal region”.27
A CASE STUDY 9
Salinisation (salinity
inundation) The condition in
which the salt content of soil
accumulates over time to above
normal levels; [it] occurs when
water containing high salt
concentration evaporates from
fields irrigated with standing
water.24
3 
Human security impacts in
vulnerable areas 
The concept of ‘human security’ encompasses security in its widest sense and includes both
‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’ insecurities, which are often closely inter-
linked. This chapter looks first at how environmental changes are exacerbating already
severe insecurities related to freedom from want (e.g. food security, health security,
economic security and environmental security). It then considers how these insecurities are
in turn causing greater ‘freedom from fear’ insecurities relating to communal tensions and
increased crime and violence, including sexual violence. Lastly, it looks at some of the coping
mechanisms employed by people living in areas that are vulnerable to climate change.
3.1 Environmental changes and increased ‘freedom from want’ insecurities
With an annual per capita income of US$440, Bangladesh is one of the world’s least 
developed countries.28 The capacity of the state to provide its citizens with human security 
is relatively low for a variety of economic, political and structural reasons.29 The greater the
environmental damage caused by climate change, the more likely it is that the state will be
overwhelmed and that its capacity to provide basic security will decline further, with 
potentially devastating effects. For example, the German Advisory Council on Global
Change undertook a scenario mapping exercise of the possible impact of climate change 
on Bangladesh. According to one projection, the impacts of climate change could lead to an
unstable economic situation, where by 2015 development efforts have been reversed and 
natural disaster management amounts for 15 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).30
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Even if such pessimistic scenarios are not borne out, it is already clear from this report’s field
research that the prevalence of naturally occurring hazards is leading to a reduction in – and
heightened demand for – essential resources. These resources are central to sustaining liveli-
hoods in Bangladesh in locations affected by climate change, such as water, land, agricultural
and fishing equipment, medical supplies, fuel, employment opportunities and food. At least
six negative trends were observed that are related to the environmental degradation caused
by climate change:
■ loss of property and material goods – cattle, houses and seeds
■ loss and degradation of agricultural land, leading to greater food insecurity
■ increased unemployment
■ reduction in the availability of water
■ increase in the prevalence of diseases, and
■ reduced availability of firewood.
Loss of property and material goods – cattle, houses and seeds
Property is central to sustaining livelihoods and generating income. Any loss can decrease
capability to fulfil basic needs, and can act as a poverty and unemployment multiplier. In
many cases, the victims of naturally occurring hazards are forced to take out loans to replace
their losses. These loans are often difficult to repay, which can further decrease livelihood
security and strain traditional coping mechanisms.
The loss of cattle was a key concern for focus group participants in areas affected by river
flooding in Sirajganj District. Communities have found it increasingly difficult to move their
animals to high enough ground before the onset of river flooding; as a result, many cattle
have drowned. This concern has become more acute in recent years as floods have become
more frequent and less predictable.
Participants from the discussion held in Kaiyarbil village (Kutubdia Island) highlighted that
damage and destruction to fishing boats, located either onshore or in ocean fishing zones,
have destroyed the livelihoods of many fishermen.31
The loss of houses, either because they were submerged during flooding or because they
subsided as a result of river erosion, was also identified as a main concern by some focus
group participants. For example, people in Binutia Village (Sirajganj District) stated that all
the houses in their village had been submerged during previous floods and that 80 percent
from the neighbouring village had been similarly affected.32 As a result, many villagers were
forced to sleep on rooftops or find temporary shelter in neighbouring communities. In
many cases, the loss of property has forced people to search for alternative employment
opportunities.
Damage to infrastructure, such as roads, as a result of rising sea levels has had a negative
impact on the ability of people to move between villages and towns and to transport 
agricultural goods to markets, making it increasingly difficult to sustain livelihoods.
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Participants from the discussion
held in Kaiyarbil village
(Kutubdia Island) highlighted
that damage and destruction to
fishing boats, located either
onshore or in ocean fishing
zones, has destroyed the
livelihoods of many fishermen.
Loss and degradation of agricultural land, leading to greater food insecurity
Presently, 144 million people live on 144,000 square kilometres of land, making Bangladesh
the most densely populated larger country in the world.33 Nearly 70 percent of the 
population depend on agriculture for their livelihoods,34 and most of the land is currently
used for agricultural purposes. Therefore, any loss of land or degradation in its fertility
caused by climate change present a serious source of livelihood insecurity.
According to the IPCC, Bangladesh is projected to lose the largest amount of cultivated land
globally due to rising sea levels. This could lead to a significant drop in the production of rice
(8 percent) and wheat (32 percent) by the year 2050.35 Sea-level rises have already led to the
loss of land in many coastal areas of Bangladesh. The Chairman of the Kaiyarbil Union
(Kutubdia Island), for example, noted that 4.5 square kilometres of the union had become
submerged under the sea since 1991, affecting 725 families.36
Meanwhile, much other land has declined in fertility and become unproductive due to 
environmental factors. River flooding has led to the depositing of large quantities of sand on
agricultural land, which has destroyed soil fertility and crops. Farmers participating in the
focus group discussion held in Gala Union (Sirajganj District) identified a case where two
consecutive floods in 2007 caused farmers to lose two sets of crops, leaving them without
income for six months.37
Coastal flooding and the intrusion of salt water on land similarly result in loss of cultivatable
land. Although there is no official record of reduced agricultural output due to salinity of the
soil, analysts estimate the drop in agricultural production could be as much as 50 percent
over the past 30 years.38 Participants from the focus group discussion held in Chakpata 
Village (Bogra District) stated that it was still not yet possible to grow any crops on land that
had been contaminated with salt over ten years ago.39
If climate change leads to significant temperature rises, this is likely to further decrease 
agricultural productivity. Climate scenario exercises for Bangladesh in the UNDP Human
Development Report for 2007/8 suggest that a 4°C temperature rise could reduce rice 
production by 30 percent and wheat production by 50 percent.40
While agricultural productivity has suffered, many areas have tried to evolve to maximise 
the opportunities available in their locality. In Khulna and Satkhira Districts for example,
thousands of shrimp farms have been established.41 A journalist interviewed during the field
research in Koyra Upazilla (Khulna District) stated that in some cases farmers have chosen
to shift from agricultural production to shrimp farming as a result of salinisation. Yet while
this has provided economic benefits to some people, it has also led to food insecurity for 
others and to a rise in unemployment (see below). The risk of food insecurity as a result of
the loss of arable land to salinisation and shrimp farm conversion was echoed in several
focus group discussions.
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“If the present tendency
continues, then Kutubdia one
day will be completely bereft of
agricultural lands, and then we
would be required to buy food
at higher prices.”
Participant, focus group discussion,
Kaiyarbil Union (Kutubdia Island)
The combined effect of losing land to the sea and of other agricultural land declining in 
fertility inevitably leads to greater food insecurity. This was mentioned as a concern in many
focus groups. People will be less able to grow their own food, and will be forced to buy more
food – but falling production would be likely to lead to higher prices. In Saferworld’s 2007
research into human security, food security was named as one of the five main problems 
facing nearly 40 percent of household survey respondents.42 This figure would only increase
with any decline in agricultural production.
Increased unemployment
As a result of naturally occurring hazards, many people have lost their livelihoods in the
agricultural and fishing sectors. The conversion of some coastal lands to shrimp farming 
has also increased unemployment, since shrimp farming employs at most a quarter of the 
people necessary for agricultural production and leads to an exploitative situation where
farmers are dependent on an unfavourable export market.43 A participant from the focus
group discussion held in Munshiganj Union (Satkhira District) stated that for every 
20 people employed in a 20 bigha44 paddy field one person is employed in a shrimp farm.45
Those who have lost their livelihoods in agriculture and fishing have been forced to search
for alternative work as farm labourers for others, or to migrate temporarily or permanently
in search of alternative employment. However, due to increasingly high demand for employ-
ment both at source and destination locations, there are not enough jobs available. This can
lead to tension that could result in conflict.
Reduction in the availability of water
Water shortages are also a key concern in areas affected by salinisation. Stagnant saline water
on the soil surface often seeps into groundwater stores, contaminating fresh water and 
making it useless for irrigation or drinking purposes. A participant from the focus group
discussion held in Gabura Union (Satkhira District) estimated that 75 percent of the local
population did not have access to fresh water.46
Reduced access to water has the greatest effect on women, who are often responsible for 
providing water and food for the family. Participants from the focus group discussion in
Satkhira District said that women are forced to travel greater distances to access clean water
following a naturally occurring hazard – limiting their time to engage in other livelihood
and income-generating activities.
Increase in the prevalence of diseases 
Focus group participants also associated the decline in the availability of fresh water with 
the increase in the prevalence of diseases. The contamination of water after flooding can
intensify outbreaks of skin disease, eye infection, cholera, diarrhoea, dysentery and fever.
Communities in low-lying areas that use tube-wells to access water are particularly 
vulnerable.
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“Shrimp farming can bring you
some money but you cannot eat
money.”
Participant, focus group discussion,
Gabura Union (Satkhira District)
Malaria and dengue fever are also a danger, as a result of the large numbers of mosquitoes
attracted to flood water. Saline inundation of river waters is having a significant affect on
people’s health in Bangladesh as people are forced to drink pond water once river water has
become contaminated.47 Participants from areas affected by coastal flooding and sea-level
rise also expressed concern about the increased level of disease locally following a naturally
occurring disaster.
Transporting critical patients, particularly pregnant women, to hospitals during periods of
heightened environmental insecurity is often problematic as roads may be damaged or 
inaccessible and boats are too expensive or difficult to find. Obtaining necessary medicines
may also be very difficult as a result of limited stocks or high prices.
Reduced availability of firewood
River and coastal flooding can have a detrimental impact on the availability of firewood,
which is used for cooking purposes. Floods wash away timber and crop residues such as jute
sticks, rice straw, rice hulls and sugarcane. A participant from the focus group discussion in
Kalikapur village (Sirajganj District) reported that during the flood in 2007, 50 percent of
firewood was washed away. This led to an increase in the demand for, and prices of,
firewood, resulting in competition and tension between groups.48
3.2 ‘Freedom from fear’ insecurity – increased tension and violence
As the above section has already noted in several places, competition between individuals,
families and communities over access to scarce resources may intensify feelings of vulnera-
bility and physical insecurity. Field research identified a number of cases where competition
over key livelihood resources had already led to increased levels of insecurity, crime and 
violence in Bangladesh.
Tension over land
Research identified a number of cases where naturally occurring hazards have led to an
increase in competition over land and increased incidence of crime and violence. A key
informant from a local non-governmental organisation (NGO) based in Khulna District
stated that in areas affected by salinisation there has been a rise in tensions between local
agricultural farmers and workers on shrimp farms.49 Local farmers felt marginalised and
were resentful towards the shrimp enterprises for loss of livelihood. This clash has resulted 
in periods of violence on shrimp farms and increased vandalism of farms in the districts of
Khulna and Satkhira.
Tension over property 
In several cases, there had been an increase in property theft following a naturally occurring
hazard. The most likely objects to be stolen are cattle, household goods and farming 
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“During the flood in 2007, my
daughter came down with a
fever and it cost me ten times
the standard price to transport
her to a doctor.”
Participant, focus group discussion,
Kalikapur Village (Sirajganj District) 
equipment. In Sirajganj District, for example, during periods of river flooding household
items and cattle are reported to have been stolen.50
Tension over water resources
Tension can arise between communities in areas where tube-wells are located at a low 
altitude and are thus vulnerable to contamination by salt water. Focus group participants
from Kutubdia Island identified cases where communities whose water supply had become
contaminated had come into direct competition with their neighbours in less affected areas.
This fuelled tension and led to episodes of violence on the island.51
Increased female insecurity and sexual violence
In the aftermath of a disaster, cultural restrictions on legal rights and entitlements to land
and property further limit women’s ability to secure their livelihood, or access credit needed
for recovery.52 As noted above, women also bear the burden of finding water in cases where
local access to water has reduced.
However, the effects of environmental change are not limited to a decline in the capacity of
women to secure their livelihoods. A key informant from Khulna University alleged that
there has been a rise in the incidence of sexual assault against women in areas that have 
experienced an influx of shrimp farming. The informant identified male shrimp farm 
workers – who are usually from outside the local area and have migrated to find work on the
farms – to be the main culprits.53 Sexual assault has far reaching implications for individuals,
their families and the local community as in addition to the physical abuse of the victim it
increases fear in general. Environmental change can therefore be seen as a factor contributing
to crime and violence against women. The communal implications of such sexual violence
are also significant, as it may increase tensions between groups as retribution is sought for
such crimes.
3.3 Traditional coping mechanisms 
The field research underlined the fact that people in Bangladesh are used to these kinds of
challenges and have adapted to the impact of naturally occurring floods and other hazards
for centuries. They have experienced periods of scarcity in the past and they are well 
accustomed to employing coping mechanisms. However, as climate change is increasing the
frequency and intensity of naturally occurring hazards these coping mechanisms are coming
under increasing strain, with the potential to cause conflict in the future.
Local coping mechanisms at source locations
Focus group participants from source locations provided examples of the types of coping
mechanisms that have been employed:54
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“During the floods, gangs of
robbers come and take
everything they can find.”
Focus group discussion, Kalikapur
village (Sirajganj District) 
“I lost my husband a few
months ago [January 2008]. He
died while fishing in the oceans.
With his job, my family could
survive. Now I have no income
to feed my four daughters… 
The reason for this is my
widowhood. People do not like
widowed women, particularly if
they are young like me.
Circumstance has therefore
turned me into a beggar maid.”
Focus group discussion, (Kutubdia
Island)
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Water availability ■ Collect water from neighbouring areas that are less affected by floods 
and where tube-wells are located at a higher altitude
Loss of firewood ■ Store firewood above ground level 
■ Ration firewood use by cooking only once a day
■ Plant trees for long-term sustainability
Loss of cattle ■ Keep cattle on roof tops during floods
Loss of houses ■ Construct houses using tin as opposed to mud. This makes it easier to 
transport houses to nearby less affected areas
■ Borrow money to rebuild lost property
■ Sell non-emergency goods 
Loss of land ■ Seek alternative (informal) employment
■ Seek employment as a farm labourer or in commercial shrimp farming
■ Temporary or permanent migration 
Food insecurity ■ Cultivate flood and salt resistant crops
■ Practise alternative farming methods (for example cultivate fish, rice 
and shrimp in the saline affected areas)
■ Adapt eating habits
Prevalence of diseases ■ Rely on herbal medicines. There are no formal medicinal coping 
mechanisms in place due to the high costs associated with this
Temporary migration
Temporary migration is a traditional mechanism for sustaining livelihoods during periods
of environmental insecurity. It usually comprises the short-term movement of one or two
members of a family to a different location in order to find employment. Temporary
migrants usually move to urban areas to seek employment in the informal sector (such as
rickshaw driving) or to rural areas to take up employment as labourers on commercial
farms.
It is important to recognise that temporary migration is not solely linked to natural hazards,
and that the decision to migrate temporarily is based on a number of factors. Consequently,
periodic/seasonal migration has often been undertaken regardless of the influence of
naturally occurring hazards. This economic migration is traditionally linked with farming
seasons, where people migrate during the seasons that are unfavourable to cultivation and
return during farming seasons.
“We used to be able to cope
with flooding and river erosion
as a regular part of our lives, but
recently my husband has had to
migrate for six months to a year
at a time to Habiganj to find
employment as a rickshaw driver
as the floods have become
stronger and have destroyed our
crops.”
Participant, focus group discussion,
Binutia village (Sirajganj District)
Coping mechanisms at source locations
However, the field research shows that the number of people migrating temporarily from
areas that are vulnerable to natural hazards has significantly increased over recent years, as
localised coping strategies have become more difficult to sustain.
Although the decision to migrate temporarily is determined by a number of differing 
factors, the frequency and intensity of naturally occurring hazards have increased the 
pressure on people to relocate both temporarily and on a more permanent basis.
Permanent migration
Although seasonal migration is a well established trend in Bangladesh, it appears that there
has been a significant increase in permanent migration from areas affected by climate
change. A study by the Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies shows that all types of
migration have increased significantly over recent years.55
The findings from the field research suggest that migration is increasing in response to the
severity of naturally occurring hazards and that this migration is becoming more permanent.
In two villages in Sirajganj District, for example, it was found that over 10 percent of families
had made a deliberate and permanent move to Dhaka, while an additional 20–30 percent of
people had not returned after migrating seasonally.56 Although a number of factors may
have contributed to this increase in levels of permanent migration, climate change appears
to have accelerated the process because of the reduction in opportunities in affected areas.
Permanent migration is usually preceded by temporary migration, and tends to be seen as
the solution only after all alternative coping mechanisms have been exhausted. Certain 
factors prevent people from permanently migrating, particularly the costs involved in 
relocating. Focus group participants in Kalikapur Village (Kazipur Upazila) and Binutia 
Village (Sirajganj District) stated that it costs the equivalent of £150–250 (US$230–380) to
migrate the short distance from Kalikapur to Sherpur, and would cost a lot more to relocate
longer distances.57 However, as the situation continues to worsen, the number of permanent
migrants is set to rise as more people save money to move away.
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“The majority of people living 
in areas affected by coastal
flooding and salinisation on this
island are ‘potential migrants’.
For now, they are trying to cope
through finding temporary
employment and shelter, but
most are trying to save up the
money needed to migrate.”
Participant, focus group discussion,
Kaiyarbil Union (Kutubdia Island)
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Human security impacts in
destination areas 
As Chapter 3 described, the field research found evidence that environmental problems
caused by climate change are already driving greater temporary and permanent migration
from affected areas. This chapter looks at the other side of the coin: how the influx of new
migrants influences human security dynamics in the towns and cities which receive them
(destination areas). The field research looked only at destination areas within Bangladesh i.e.
areas that are subject to internal migratory flows. There is some evidence that Bangladeshis
might also be migrating to India in response to climate change, but it was outside the scope
of this study to research this in any detail.
4.1 Conflict as a trigger for instability
Field research was undertaken in several destination areas (see table on p 5). These inter-
views and focus groups provided some evidence that an influx of migrants was leading to
increased competition over livelihood resources (land, access to employment and basic
commodities). This has fuelled tensions and divisions between established local communi-
ties and migrants, which on occasion has spilled over into violence. There were three main
triggers of conflict:
■ disputes over land
■ competition for employment, and
■ competition for access to water.
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Land disputes
A study undertaken by the Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies found that more
than half (53 percent) of poor migrants live in private slums and 44 percent squat on public
land.58 Field research found that migrants residing on government-owned ‘khas lands’ face
the greatest level of violence and physical insecurity, as competition between the poorest
migrants over this ‘free’ and publically available land is particularly fierce. In Dumuria
Upazila (Khulna District) it was noted that migrants were being threatened by local gangs
who were restricting access to land and demanding money for rent.59 In Chakpata Village
(Bogra District) overcrowding on khas land had resulted in violence between individuals
and groups over access to the land.60
Incidences of violence between local communities and migrants over land-grabbing were
recorded in several of the focus group discussions held in Dhaka, Kutubdia Island,
Chittagong and Bogra.61 For example, in Chakpata Village (Bogra District), landowners
forcibly evicted migrants from their land. Migrants responded by launching revenge attacks,
which included criminal damage and violent assault.62 Research by Rita Asfar of the
Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies supports this finding, showing that attempts
by government authorities and vested interests to evict squatters from large settlements in
Dhaka have led to heightened levels of violence and clashes between police and migrants,
which resulted in men being beaten and many women being raped.63
Competition for employment
Migrants naturally seek employment in destination areas, but since they increase the supply
of labour, their presence also leads to increased competition for jobs, particularly in the
informal sector. For example, the number of people looking to find work as a rickshaw 
driver has multiplied resulting in a saturation of the market. This means that not only is it
hard for migrants to find work, but also that there is tension between existing residents and
incoming migrants, which can lead to violence.
Another negative effect of the influx of migrants is that it is possible for employers to pay 
less and still find willing employees. These low wages are often insufficient to pay rent and
purchase food, leaving migrants in a precarious situation. Furthermore, since resident 
communities also suffer from the drop in wages, they tend to blame migrants for the situa-
tion and this can cause considerable tension. For example, a key informant interviewed in
Khulna alleged that violent attacks on migrant communities by local gangs were fuelled by
drops in the rate of pay.64
Focus group participants from Chakpata Village (Bogra District) also associated unemploy-
ment with the fact that labouring practices differ between regions; employers are 
consequently sceptical about hiring migrants. Participants noted that 75 percent of migrant
women in Sherpur, for example, remain unemployed due to their inability to adapt success-
fully to local working practices for rice milling.65
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“I have experienced harassment
and physical attack from local
rickshaw drivers when parking
my rickshaw in the areas used by
them.”
Participant, focus group discussion,
Cox’s Bazar
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Competition for access to water
Access to water is a basic human necessity and is fundamental to human development. Water
scarcity can lead to health concerns and can also heighten competition and tensions between
communities. The field research found this to be the case in destination areas, particularly 
in urban areas where the influx of migrants has meant that demand for water exceeds supply.
As reported by a focus group participant from Kalshi (Dhaka), female members of a family
may have to travel up to 70 km in order to collect water for drinking and cooking.
Participants noted a rise in tension and in some cases violence between women who are
competing to access water at collection points.
4.2 Other impacts of migration on security
Two other impacts of migration deserve to be mentioned in this chapter, although it is
beyond the scope of this research to consider them in detail.
First, climate change-related migration appears to be fuelling a growth in urban slums in
Dhaka. The majority of new arrivals are unable to find adequate housing, and are therefore
forced to live in the poorly serviced periphery. This economic poverty is seen as a significant
driver of crime and instability. A study by the World Bank in 2007 showed that while there
are considerable differences between slums, overall crime and insecurity is a major problem.66
Recent crime statistics show that levels of crime and violence have risen in destination areas.
For example, thefts in the slum areas of Dhaka such as Mohammadpur and Mirpor (Pallabi)
have increased significantly since 2006.67 It can therefore be argued that climate change-
related migration will lead to an increase in crime and insecurity in slum areas that are
already insecure.
Secondly, although no primary field research was carried out on the effects of climate
change-related migration on regional security and conflict dynamics, it is worth briefly
reviewing some of the possible consequences that have been predicted by other researchers.
In particular, there is concern that climate change could accelerate the migration of
Bangladeshis into India. Such migratory flows are already well-established, with most of the
migration happening informally/illegally. This is already a cause of some tension between
Bangladesh and India. India has already begun the construction of a 4,000 km-long barrier
along its border with Bangladesh, illustrating its existing concern about illegal immigration
from Bangladesh.68
The fear is that increased migration could heighten these tensions both at the local and at the
national level. International Alert notes that migration into Northern India, particularly into
Assam, has been going on for many years and had already caused social frictions and 
violence by the 1980s. It concludes that “if local and national governments cannot develop
measures to cope with the pressures on resources from migration and climate change, the
risk of further and more intense violence is very high”.69
The German Advisory Council on Global Change has explored these risks in greater depth,
mapping out possible scenarios that may occur in the next decades. One “fictitious 
confrontation scenario” imagines that climate change will lead to a greater influx of
migrants from Bangladesh into India, particularly the Indian states of Bihar, West Bengal
and Assam, intensifying competition over resources between migrants and residents. This,
in turn, could take the form of ethnic/religious conflict between Indian Hindus and Muslims
from Bangladesh, if the local population feels that its livelihood is under threat.70 Local 
tensions could translate into diplomatic confrontation between the two countries if the
Bangladeshi migrants are perceived as a security risk by the Indian government. At the end
of this scenario, violent conflict is a real possibility.“Because the two sides are not prepared
to engage in political dialogue, the environmental migrants become a security problem.
The political conflict between the two states escalates; India threatens Bangladesh with 
‘humanitarian intervention’ on the pretext that the environmental migrants represent a 
terrorist threat.”71 While this scenario may currently seem far-fetched, it is not at all 
improbable that climate change-related migration could act as a complicating factor in the
relationship between the two countries.
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Conclusion and
recommendations
In Chapter 1, five potential threats to security stemming from climate change were identified
based on international research:
■ insecurity in affected communities due to competition for resources
■ insecurity in ‘destination areas’ due to tensions and competition for resources between 
existing residents and incoming migrants
■ lower state capacity to provide security because of lack of resources and the need to address
greater insecurity
■ tension between states over increased cross-border migratory flows, and
■ tension between states due to increased competition for resources.
This research has found evidence to suggest that such processes may indeed be occurring in
Bangladesh. To date, insecurity linked to competition over resources has not catalysed high
levels of violence or conflict in Bangladesh. Yet negative trends are visible, and the fear is that
as climate change leads to greater environmental degradation, the risk of serious instability
will grow.
Evidence that climate change is influencing security and conflict dynamics
First, the field research showed that the environmental degradation caused by climate
change means that there are fewer resources available, and thus competition for these
resources is intensifying in affected areas. There was ample evidence that this is leading to
increased tension that can easily become violent, including disputes over land and water
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resources and a rise in property theft. There also appears to be some evidence that the social
instability associated with the degradation of resources is fuelling an increase in violence
against women.
Secondly, it does appear to be the case that climate change is accelerating migration flows
from affected areas and that this influx of migrants is contributing to insecurity in destina-
tion areas, relating to competition for land, employment and access to water. Migrants face 
a double insecurity: it is hard for them to find employment and provide for their basic needs,
but they are also held responsible by existing residents for the increased competition for
resources, and face the threat of reprisal from them.
Thirdly, it has briefly been noted that cross-border migratory flows are increasing due to 
climate change, and that this is already leading to tensions with India – as symbolised by the
border fence that India is building.72 This research did not explore this security threat in
detail (and did not look at all at the competition between Bangladesh and India for
resources), but it seems probable that climate change is exacerbating what are already 
contentious issues in diplomatic relations between the two states.
Lastly, it can be argued that the lack of resources will hinder the capacity of the state to
respond effectively. Saferworld’s 2007 human security survey raised many areas of concern
relating to the state’s ability to provide basic ‘freedom from want’ security (economic, food,
health and environmental security) and to the effectiveness of the state security sector in
maintaining peace and security from threats of crime and violence.73 A lack of resources is
an underlying problem in all cases. The field research for this paper has shown that many
localities are already facing economic problems as a result of environmental degradation.
Scaled up to the national level, it is not difficult to imagine that climate change could 
seriously weaken the national economy and leave the state with even fewer resources to deal
with ever-growing insecurity.
The degree to which climate change impacts upon security and conflict dynamics will
depend in large part on the severity of the climate change itself. If major climate change
occurs, the results could be truly devastating. For example, UNDP analysts suggest that a
global temperature rise of 3–4°C could result in over 70 million people in Bangladesh being
temporarily or permanently displaced through flooding.75 The security implications of the
migration of so many people could be unimaginably serious, easily swamping the capacity
of established coping mechanisms within the country. Large-scale migration would be very
likely to exacerbate tensions between local and migrant communities over access to
resources and employment, resulting in a breakdown in social cohesion and a rise in crime
levels.76
From a conflict analysis perspective, climate change is not in itself a direct cause of conflict;
analysing how climate change will affect security and conflict dynamics is about under-
standing the ‘consequences of consequences’.77 Climate change – or more precisely, the 
“We are facing a catastrophe in
this country. We are talking
about an absolutely massive
displacement of human
beings.”
Dr Atiq Rahman, a leading member
of the IPCC74
“Where will future migrants go?
We have already taken all the
available khas and prices are too
high to rent land. We won’t be
able to help them, we are all
facing a growth in competition
over land and jobs – we will
have to protect ourselves.”
Participant, focus group discussion,
Cox’s Bazar
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environmental damage caused by climate change – acts as a ‘threat multiplier’, fuelling exist-
ing conflict dynamics or contributing to the development of new ones.78 Climate change is
thus indirectly creating conditions where it is probable that there will be more crime, more
violence and less social stability; in short, climate change increases the likelihood of some
form of serious conflict within Bangladesh.
The absence of a response, and difficult questions to answer
The question therefore is how policy-makers, both within Bangladesh and internationally,
should respond to this. This is an extremely complicated question, as the discussion below
will show. However, first of all it is worth noting that there is currently no mention of the
security dimension of climate change in existing climate change strategies relating to
Bangladesh.
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change has launched ‘National Adaptation
Programmes of Action’ (NAPA) to help developing countries adapt to the impacts of climate
change and identify and address individual countries’ needs. The purpose of these 
programmes is to identify and address urgent adaptation needs so as to avoid vulnerability
in the longer term. The Government of Bangladesh has already used this mechanism to
make substantial progress on climate change mitigation and adaptation. However,
Bangladesh’s NAPA79 does not currently address the prospect of large-scale migration and
resulting socio-political pressures. There are no clear recommendations for how 
communities can best absorb these pressures in a way that would prevent insecurity turning
into instability and conflict.
The Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan agreed by the Government of Bangladesh in
September 2008 recognises the need to support social protection of vulnerable groups
through community-level adaptation programmes. It also calls for further research into the
linkages between climate change, poverty and vulnerability and looks to build the capacity
of government ministries and civil society to take forward adaptation programmes.80 Yet it
too has no clear recommendations for addressing the potential security and conflict-related
risks of climate change.
The absence of the security dimension of climate change from these strategies is perhaps
unsurprising given that analysis of the link between climate change and increasing 
insecurity is only now developing. Yet the analysis above suggests there is a trend towards
greater insecurity that cannot easily be reversed; the security dimension will have to be
addressed, and preferably sooner rather than later.
The question is how. The easy assumption to make is that more insecurity means that more
funding should be available to security sector actors in order to boost security. This may be
one part of the solution, but it is far from the whole solution, and it is likely that policy-
makers whose prime concern is combating climate change will find it hard to believe that
their cause can best be addressed by funding security sector actors. In fact, the question of
how to respond to the security dimension of climate change mirrors many of the major
challenges that the climate change community as a whole faces.
First, it can be very difficult to develop effective policies to combat processes when the effect
of these processes may not become evident until many years hence – or not at all if the 
policies are successful. The minds of both voters and policy-makers are therefore easily 
distracted by more pressing current concerns. This makes it hard to create the necessary
political consensus and momentum to develop and implement appropriate policies. Since
the links between climate change and security are not immediately obvious, there is little
incentive for policy-makers to expend energy (and resources) on the matter when other
problems seem easier both to understand and to address.
Secondly, policy-makers constantly face a decision about how they should balance their 
priorities between trying to prevent climate change from occurring in the first place, and
adapting to the consequences of climate change that have been impossible to prevent.
Logically, the quicker that climate change can be prevented, the less impact it will have, and
therefore the less need there will be for adaptation mechanisms. (For example, if there is no
environmental degradation and people do not find it harder to maintain their livelihoods,
this cannot be a factor causing migration to other areas.) Yet the 2007 IPCC Working Group
II report acknowledged that some climate change has already occurred and that it may not
be possible to prevent completely further environmental changes even if there is no further
rise in greenhouse gases – thus making some degree of adaptation necessary. Where should
the balance be struck? Many would argue that the first priority is to halt further climate
change as quickly as possible, and that to spend resources on adaptation rather than 
prevention is not only defeatist but actually increases the risk that climate change will spiral
out of control. Yet if climate change is going to lead to serious environmental and social
changes, resources will need to be spent more directly on addressing these challenges at
some point. In short, this is a dilemma that cannot be easily resolved and depends as much
on political standpoints as it does on scientific analysis.
Thirdly, even if it is agreed that adaptation measures are necessary and that reasonable
resources should be allocated to implementing such measures, how should they be spent?
For example, looking specifically at the question of climate-related migration, should the
state put all its resources into adaptation of vulnerable areas to make them better able to
withstand the impact of climate change (which should reduce the desire of local inhabitants
to migrate), or should it accept that some migration will be inevitable and thus strengthen
the capacity of destination areas to handle an influx in migrants? 
Fourthly, should adaptation measures focus only on making societies more resilient against
immediate environmental changes (e.g. by building cyclone shelters or improving flood
defences), or should adaptation policy also take into account the wider social implications 
of these environmental changes? For example, if there is strong evidence that environmental
degradation is leading to an upsurge in conflict over land, water and other resources which
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threatens to escalate into major disturbances, should adaptation funds also be tasked with
improving policing or strengthening peaceful community dispute resolution mechanisms
such as shalishi?81
Recommendations
These dilemmas set out above cannot be resolved fully in this short report. However, it is
possible to make some overall observations about the best way to limit the impact of climate
change on security and conflict dynamics, and to make some modest recommendations for
steps ahead.
Promote a cross-governmental approach to climate change and security
One point that deserves emphasis is the strong mutuality of interest between those working
on climate change and those whose job it is to maintain security. The fundamental purpose
of climate change policy is to prevent or reduce the impact of climate change on human life;
although this may not be consciously acknowledged, climate change policy thus directly
works to limit the negative impact of climate change on security and conflict dynamics.
Equally, while security sector actors are responsible for maintaining security, many of the
underlying causes of insecurity and conflict lie outside their sphere of influence. Since an
effective climate change policy would prevent or reduce the impact of climate change on 
vulnerable communities, it is effectively reducing the workload of the security sector.
This does not mean that security sector agencies should directly seek to prevent climate
change, or that climate change policy should concern itself with policing. What it does mean
is that the government as a whole should recognise that effectively combating climate
change makes a positive contribution to security, and that security and justice provision
need to be improved as part of the state’s measures to adapt to the effects of climate change.
This does not necessarily imply that resources allocated for ‘adaptation’ should be spent on
security sector actors – though the possibility should not be ruled out. But at a minimum,
the government should be seeking to ensure that there is harmony between the long-term
goals of climate change and security policy and that the relevant actors are co-operating
effectively where necessary.
At the moment, information is not shared well enough within or between ministries and
there is limited recognition of the connections between different departments and 
ministries working on issues relating to climate change, migration and security. The 
establishment of climate security working groups, for example, would help ensure political
authorities, international institutions, climate scientists, conflict prevention/peacebuilding
experts and social scientists all share their experience and knowledge.
Current donor and government policy and programmatic development on migration, land,
environment, climate change and security are not joined-up. To mitigate the risk of conflict
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linked to climate change, it will be fundamental to promote a cross-government and donor
approach in which all areas of climate change, migration and security policies work towards
a shared goal leading to integrated responses. It is also essential that the policies and funding
streams relating both to climate change and to conflict and security fully acknowledge the
linkages between climate change and insecurity and approach the resourcing of relevant
programmes in a flexible manner.
Ensure that all climate change adaptation and development programming is 
conflict-sensitive
Perhaps the most important point is that from a security perspective, climate change is just
one of many drivers that may affect security and conflict dynamics, and that to a large extent,
the means to address any insecurities caused by climate change will be no different from the
means to address insecurities caused by anything else. First, this means strengthening the
overall capacity of the state to provide for basic human security, and strengthening the
capacity of key security sector actors to maintain peace, security and justice. In this sense,
social and economic development, combined with good governance, is an adaptation 
strategy in itself.
Security analysts have long been aware that some development activities may actually fuel
conflict. This has led to an emphasis on ‘conflict-sensitive development’ i.e. ensuring that
development activities are sensitive to conflict dynamics and that they do nothing to
increase the risk of conflict and maximise positive effects. All major development activities
should be analysed for their conflict sensitivity as a matter of course.
As climate change policy becomes more prominent, it will be equally necessary to ensure
that climate change policy is conflict-sensitive, particularly when adaptation measures are
being implemented. This is not only about environmental policy. For example, competition
over land exacerbated by climate change is a key driver of tension and violence, particularly
in the case of khas land. Integrating a conflict-sensitive approach into the planning and
implementation of land tenure policy is therefore fundamental to preventing conflict of this
nature.
It is crucial to develop a preventative approach to addressing the risk of insecurity and
conflict in Bangladesh, as opposed to responding to security and conflict crises as they occur.
As part of this, conflict triggers should be fully understood and addressed through conflict-
sensitive programming. In other words, if existing or future conflict dynamics are taken into
account, climate policy can also become conflict prevention policy.
This should be achieved by:
i) Undertaking a peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) of existing climate change 
programmes
A PCIA is a method of analysing the potential impact that a given governmental or donor
Conflict-sensitive
Being conflict-sensitive is about:
1. Understanding local conflict
dynamics
2. Analysing the potential
effects of activity by
governments, donors and
other organisations on these
conflict dynamics
3. Ensuring that any actions that
are undertaken avoid
negative impacts and
maximise positive effects
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programme might have on conflict dynamics in a specific country or area. First, those
undertaking the PCIA review the current social, political, and economic situation in the area
in order to understand the likelihood of conflict and the reasons why conflict might occur.
They then use this baseline analysis to predict what impact their programme might have on
these conflict dynamics.
A PCIA of existing and future climate change programmes would thus allow for the 
development of strategies which have maximum impact on reducing insecurity and the risk
of conflict in Bangladesh.82
ii) Taking a consultative approach to the development of national and local policy on climate
change and security 
Mechanisms for consulting with local communities would provide greater information on
which to base initial policy development and could be used to test a policy’s acceptability
with, and relevance to, affected groups. Local communities are often best placed to help
identify conflict risks and potential solutions and to provide feedback on the impact of
adaptation programmes on conflict dynamics.
As was noted above, current strategies to address climate change in Bangladesh do not 
contain adequate provisions relating to the likely impact of climate change on security and
conflict dynamics. A conflict-sensitive approach to future policy and adaptation 
programming is required. This could be integrated into the Bangladesh Climate Change
Strategy and Action Plan 2008 in a number of ways:
■ ‘Research and knowledge management’ could include research on the linkages between 
climate change, poverty and insecurity.
■ ‘Research on climate change scenarios’ could link up with and support scenario development
of potential security and conflict situations.
■ Recommendations on ‘food security, social protection and health’ could consider the impact
that potential security and conflict-related dynamics could have upon community-based
adaptation programmes and vice versa, through a conflict-sensitive approach.
■ Recommendations on ‘capacity building and institutional strengthening’ could include
strengthening governance mechanisms to respond to the security and conflict-related risks
of climate change.
Overall, sound adaptation programmes have the potential to improve capacity to cope with
naturally occurring hazards and improve security across Bangladesh. However, as outlined
above, this potential can be devalued if they are planned and implemented in a way that is
insensitive to group needs or aggravates tensions in communities. Adaptation programming
for Bangladesh therefore needs to take into account potential conflict dynamics in order to
ensure it enhances adaptation capabilities in a sustainable and conflict-sensitive way.
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Integrate analysis of the predicted impact of climate change into all future conflict
analysis
The above section has focused on ensuring that all activities that relate to climate change are
conflict-sensitive. However, the impact of climate change on security should not be 
considered only with relation to climate change policies and activities. This paper has shown
that the environmental changes caused by climate change indirectly contribute to conflict
dynamics. Therefore, all future conflict analyses of Bangladesh should include the potential
impact of climate change as a factor to be reviewed; this paper should provide some 
preliminary ideas as to the likely impact of climate change on security dynamics.
Strengthen the capacity of local government
Like many other developing countries affected by climate change, Bangladesh has limited
capacity to address the issue of conflict linked to climate change. National government
endeavours will be more relevant, sustainable and ultimately strengthened if local govern-
ment is provided with a more central role in activities. As many environmental security
issues are essentially local in nature, local governments (and local communities more 
generally) will be able to identify and introduce initiatives and policies which are sensitive to
local contexts. This will in turn enable groups in source and destination areas to better 
manage limited resources. This empowerment could also reduce insensitivity in project design
and implementation and thus minimise the potential for climate change-induced violence.
In a Saferworld survey conducted in 2007 key informants listed some of the ways in which positive
changes can result in more comprehensive and conflict-sensitive policy programming. These 
included:
■ Developing an information base: In many fields, statistical information is absent or unreliable, 
meaning decision-making is more likely to be based on personal perceptions and on anecdotal 
evidence such as media surveys.
■ Introducing consultation mechanisms: Consultation mechanisms would provide greater 
information on which to base initial policy development, and could be used to ‘test’ a policy’s 
acceptability to different affected groups. 
■ Providing more resources for implementation: Ministries tend to be under-resourced and 
have limited power to implement their responsibilities.
■ Decentralising authority: Information and authority is not well enough dispersed either within 
ministries or between them.
Source: Human security in Bangladesh, Saferworld (2008) 
It is at the local level where the security-related impacts of climate change are likely to be
most evident and from where potential tensions at the national level are likely to stem. Thus,
it is at this level that adaptation and mitigation programming will be most likely to succeed
or fail. It is therefore imperative that adaptation and mitigation programming at this level
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integrates the security implications of climate change through a conflict-sensitive approach.
The Committee on the Strengthening of Local Government has proposed a number of
measures to reinvigorate local government. Improved local government would have a
significant impact on personal security, since many localised security issues are best
addressed by local communities acting on local knowledge. Capacity-building and training
on the security-related aspects of climate change adaptation and mitigation programming
should be included in efforts to reinvigorate and improve local government.
Begin a debate on the balance between mitigation and adaptation policies
This report has noted that there are many challenging questions relating to how to balance
the prioritisation and funding of policies that seek to slow or mitigate climate change with
those that seek to adapt to the impact of climate change. It has not tried to answer these
questions – yet they will require an answer. The dilemma is particularly pressing for
Bangladesh, given its specifically vulnerable circumstances relating to climate change.
It is therefore imperative that these issues are discussed openly both by policy-makers and 
politicians and by society as a whole.
Allow local communities to spend adaptation resources on conflict prevention and
security-building if required
One of the most controversial questions that has been raised is whether it is worthwhile, or
even legitimate, for resources that are allocated for ‘adaptation’ to be used to address security
and justice concerns. This is a complex issue, and much greater research and debate will be
required. However, it may be argued that since the impacts of climate change will be felt
most keenly at the level of local communities, there should be some flexibility to allow local
communities to allocate some adaptation resources on security measures if they feel it is
necessary, using a community safety approach. A community safety approach is one where
local residents and local authorities work together co-operatively to identify the main threats
to the safety and security of the community and agree methods of reducing this insecurity.
For example, if there is widespread recognition that competition for resources is leading to
high levels of tension and increased theft and other crime, the local community may feel that
policing and justice mechanisms urgently need to be strengthened. In such cases, it would be
unfortunate if adaptation resources were too inflexibly ‘ring-fenced’ and it was thus not 
possible to allocate them to conflict prevention or community safety measures.
Strengthen capacity to manage internal migration
A central theme of this report has been that climate change will lead to an acceleration of
internal migratory flows, which in turn will lead to greater insecurity in destination areas.
Part of any strategy must address the underlying causes of such migration, with the expecta-
tion that if these problems are dealt with, migration will decrease as a result. However, it
must also be acknowledged that considerable internal migration may be unavoidable, and
that in such circumstances, destination areas will have to deal with the consequences. This
report has not reviewed any existing national or city-level policies for managing internal
migration and adapting to an influx of migrants in destination areas, so it is not possible to
evaluate the capacity of the state and of relevant local authorities to manage internal 
migration. However, given the potential scale of migration in the coming decades, it is highly
likely that internal migration will be a major strain on the state and that its capacity to 
manage such migration will need to be considerably strengthened in order to cope.
Conduct more detailed policy research 
The field research undertaken for this paper is an important step in understanding the effect
climate change is having on communities and their security in affected areas in Bangladesh.
However, it is not a comprehensive assessment of the situation in Bangladesh, and these 
preliminary findings have shown that further research and analysis is crucial to better
understand the links between climate change, security and conflict and to inform the 
development of more conflict-sensitive adaptation policies.
There is a pressing need to undertake comprehensive research to understand fully the effect
of climate change on security and conflict dynamics, both within Bangladesh and inter-
nationally. The following list suggests some of the topics that require further research in
Bangladesh:
■ A mapping of the areas in Bangladesh which are most likely to experience insecurity as a
direct result of environmental changes caused by climate change. This should identify those
‘source areas’ where it is predicted that environmental problems are most likely to lead to
significant insecurity. This would be highly useful to policy-makers in order to assess the
scale of the risk and to begin planning appropriate responses.
■ A detailed analysis of existing community security and conflict prevention mechanisms,
both formal and informal, in these vulnerable source areas, with the intention of identifying
possible measures to reduce the risk of serious insecurity in these areas and reduce the 
likelihood that people will seek to migrate away from these areas.
■ A thorough analysis of the extent to which climate change is already fuelling migration away
from affected areas of Bangladesh, and a prediction of the extent to which it is likely to do so
in future. While it is impossible to quantify exactly how significant a factor climate change is
in decisions to migrate (which will usually have multiple causes), a more detailed analysis of
this relationship and the extent to which climate change fuels migration is necessary for 
policy-makers to predict how climate change might influence migratory flows.
■ Research should map more precisely the likely movement of migrants from source areas to
destination areas both within Bangladesh and to neighbouring countries. This would show
patterns of potential migration and help to identify likely security and conflict impacts that
could be addressed through effective early warning and conflict prevention strategies and
action.
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■ A review of how Bangladesh currently manages migration (both internal and external), of
both official state management of migration and of informal coping and adaptation 
strategies, in order to identify how well such mechanisms will cope with increased strain as 
a result of climate change-related migration.
Adopt a regional approach to combating climate change and managing migration
Further research is also required into how climate change will affect regional security and
conflict dynamics, and how prepared national, bilateral and regional security mechanisms
are to cope with emerging threats – particularly greater cross-border migration. As this
paper has described, some scenarios have already been put forward about the potential
impact of climate change on migration and thus on cross-border security,83 but they have
not been fleshed out and analysed in any detail. Therefore it is crucial that further research 
is undertaken to assess the impact of climate change on security at the regional level and to
develop more scenarios. This is important to help identify what capacity is needed at the
regional level to respond to and prevent the risk of heightened insecurity and conflict as a
result of climate change. This could lead to the development of a regional climate security
policy and conflict-sensitive regional adaptation and mitigation programmes.
Annex 1: Methodology
A combination of desk and field research was undertaken for this report. Field research
included key informant interviews and focus group discussions in case study locations in
areas that are both the ‘source’ and ‘destination’ of environmental migration. Information 
on the participants for the focus group discussions and interviews are outlined in the tables
below.
Research took place during a six-week period from 17 March to 2 May 2008. Research was
undertaken by a team of researchers comprising Dr Abdur Rob Khan (Head of Non-
Traditional Security), Dr Abul Kalam Azad (Senior Research Fellow), Dr A T Salahuddin
Ahmed (Senior Research Fellow), Ms Neila Husain (Senior Research Fellow), Ms Segufta
Hossain (Research Officer), Mr A B M Ziaur Rahman (Research Fellow), Mr Mohammad
Aynul Islam (Research Officer), and Mr Mohammad Jasim Uddin (Research Officer) from
BIISS, with additional support from Saferworld.
Focus groups 
Information on the focus groups undertaken is outlined below:
Migration source
Focus group Number of 
Issue locations Date participants Age range Socio-economic profile
Salinity Shinghertali Village, 15 April 2008 10 18–50 4 women, 6 men
Munshiganj Union, Professions include Shrimp cultivators, businessmen, 
Satkhira District labourers, farmers, village doctor, student
Chaklbara Village, 16 April 2008 13 23–65 8 men, 5 women
Gabura Union, Professions include fishermen, tailor, students, 
Satkhira District carpenter, housewife
Dakshin Bedkashi 19 April 2008 11 21–85 7 men, 4 women
Village, Koyra Union, Professions include labourer, shrimp cultivator, farmer, 
Khulna District fishermen, housewives, students
Flood Charpachattaur Village, 23 April 2008 10 19–49 6 men, 4 women
Chargirish Union, Professions include farmer, labourer, housewife, 
Sirajganj District petit commerce, fishermen, student
Bunotia Village, 24 April 2008 14 32–56 5 women, 9 men
Gala Union, Professions include farmers, labourers, 
Sirajganj District petit commerce, housewife, salt cultivator
Sea level Dakshin Dhurung, 14 April 2008 15 22–54 3 women, 12 men
rise Kutubdia Professions include carpenter, fishermen, 
salt cultivator, landless, farmer, student
Kaiyarbil, Kutubdia 14 April 2008 13 32–56 8 men, 5 women
Professions include fishermen, drivers, imams, 
salt cultivators, housewives, students
Baraghop, Kutubdia 15 April 2008 15 29–63 6 women, 9 men
Professions include labourers, fishermen, landless, 
housewives, farmers and rickshaw pullers
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Focus group Number of 
Issue locations Date participants Age range Socio-economic profile
Sea level Ali Akbar Dail, 16 April 2008 14 30–58 7 women, 7 men
rise cont. Kutubdia Professions include landless, housewives, farmers, 
rickshaw drivers, labourers
Uttar Dhurang, 17 April 2008 17 25–70 6 women, 11 men
Kutubdia Professions include landless, fishermen, labourers, 
farmer, rickshaw drivers, salt cultivator
Lemiskhala, Kutubdia 17 April 2008 16 24–68 6 women, 10 men
Professions include landless, farmers, fishermen, 
housewives, rickshaw puller, students
Note: Two informal FGDs were also conducted in Kutubdia with two fishing communities. 
Migration destination
Focus group Number of 
Issue locations Date participants Age range Socio-economic profile
Salinity Islamnagar Village, 21 April 2008 8 24–58 5 men, 3 women
Khulna Sadar, Khulna Professions include farmer, salt cultivator, 
businessmen, petit commerce, students
Notun Bazar, 21 April 2008 3 20–61 2 men, 1 woman
Khulna Sadar, Professions include farmer, salt cultivator and 
Khulna District housewife
Adabor Slum, 29 April 2008 9 31–59 6 men, 3 women
Mohammadpur, Professions include petit commerce, housewife, 
Dhaka rickshaw driver, student
Flood Chalkpata Village, 25 April 2008 6 26–69 4 men, 2 women
Mirzapur Union, Professions include farmer, rickshaw driver, 
Bogra District businessmen, student housewife
Kalshi, Pallabi, Dhaka 1 May 2008 11 22–63 5 women, 6 men
Professions include rickshaw driving, petit commerce, 
student, housewife, carpenter, barber
Sea level Uriar Gachtola, 18 April 2008 15 24–65 6 women, 9 men
rise Cox’s Bazar Professions include students, rickshaw drivers, 
salt cultivators, businessmen, fishermen
Teknaf, 18 April 2008 15 29–62 7 women, 8 men
Cox’s Bazar Professions include fishermen, rickshaw drivers, 
salt cultivator, farmers
Rang Mahat, Dulhazari, 19 April 2008 17 31–72 6 women, 11 men
Chokoria, Cox’s Bazar Professions include rickshaw driving, farmer, teacher, 
housewife
Ali Kadam, Bandarban, 19 April 2008 15 23–59 7 women, 8 men
Chittagong Hill Tracts Professions include housewife, barbers, student, 
government worker, businessmen
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Key informant interviews 
Key informant interviews were conducted with a range of officials from government 
institutions, local elites, civil society, media, NGOs and security agencies.
Key informant interviews were undertaken in each of the participating locations as follows:
Issue Location Date No. of interviewees
Salinity Khulna City 12/13 April 2008 6
Shyamnagar Upazilla 14–17 April 2008 7
Koyra Upazilla 19 April 2008 2
Flood Sirajganj Sadar 22 April 2008 2
SLR Kutubdia 13–17 April 2008 31 
Chittagong 21/22 April 2008 10
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violent conflict and promote co-operative approaches to security. We work with governments, 
international organisations and civil society to encourage and support effective policies and practices
through advocacy, research and policy development and through supporting the actions of others. 
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Climate change is predicted to have an overall negative
impact on long-term security and conflict dynamics, acting
as a threat multiplier that increases the volatility of existing
causes of conflict and may generate new insecurities. There
is significant evidence to suggest that the environmental
degradation caused by climate change is already fuelling
insecurity, in particular related to a growth in internal
migration.
This case study provides an insight into the potential impact
of climate change on security and conflict dynamics in
Bangladesh. It forms part of a series of papers exploring the
relationship between violent conflict, insecurity and climate
change that seek to generate further debate and action on
this important topic.
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